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Abstract
This research examines the effects of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) on 
the location decisions of pollution-intensive manufacturing plants. We develop a panel 
data set to analyze plant births of polluting manufacturers over time as a function 
county-level attainment status of the federal standard for ozone pollution. We find that 
more stringent county-level environmental regulations impact pollution-intensive 
capital flows through deterring new plant births. We also find that the impact of stricter 
regulations varies by pollution-intensity of manufacturers, with results suggesting that 
federal guidelines have a greater impact on high pollution intensive manufacturers than 
more moderate polluters.
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between the spatial heterogeneity in environmental regulations and 
the firm location decision for polluting manufacturers has been debated in the 
academic and legislative arena for a number of years. Central to the debate is the 
argument that interjurisdictional competition will induce a “race to the bottom” phenomenon 
where local legislators set environmental regulatory standards below optimal 
levels to attract polluting industries to the region. 
The general theoretical assumption is that lax environmental regulatory standards 
attract capital flows (Kahn 1997; List and Mason 2001), yet support from the empirical 
literature is divided. In general, earlier studies find little or no statistical evidence 
of a relationship between environmental regulation and firm location. More recent 
empirical work largely contradicts earlier research, citing a number of shortcomings 
in earlier data sets and estimation techniques and, in general, provides much stronger 
statistical support for the hypothesis that the firm location decision is affected by more 
stringent regulatory standards. 
An example of earlier research, Bartik (1988) uses a conditional logit model to 
measure the impact of a number of regulatory measures on new manufacturing plants 
opened by the Fortune 500 companies between 1972 and 1978. He finds no significant 
relationship in any of the regulatory coefficients. McConnell and Schwab (1990) 
examine the location decision of motor vehicle assembly plants between the years 
1973 and 1982 and find no impact of regulatory enforcement or manufacturing abatement 
expenditures on the firms’ location decisions. Duffo-Deno (1992) examines the 
relationship between manufacturing abatement costs and Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (SMSA) earnings and employment growth, and while he finds a negative 
relationship, the impact is slight. Levinson (1996) considers six environmental indicators 
but finds that the effects of more stringent regulations on firm location are small 
and do not vary as expected with the pollution intensity of the industry. 
In line with recent research supporting the hypothesis of environmental regulations 
impacting firm location, List et al. (1999) focus on air quality attainment standards. 
Although they find that plant location decisions are largely uncorrelated with 
county attainment levels, for pollution-intensive firms, they find statistical evidence 
of a decrease in the number of births in counties that failed to meet federal air quality 
standards. Becker and Henderson (2000) use a conditional Poissonmodel and find that 
air quality regulations significantly reduce the number of births in nonattainment areas 
relative to attainment areas. Further, List (2001) considers new foreign manufacturing 
births in counties throughout California between 1983 and 1992, and finds that more 
stringent pollution regulations have a negative effect on new manufacturing plants 
in pollution-intensive industries. Henderson (1996), Keller and Levinson (1999), List 
and McHone (2000), and List et al. (2004) all add further support to the hypothesis of 
regulatory impacts. 
In acknowledging the disparity in empirical findings, a number of common shortcomings 
are apparent in earlier work. First, data limitations narrowed the scope of 
studies in terms of industrial or geographical detail. Due to the unavailability of micro 
data on establishments, economists had to settle with aggregate measures of economic 
activity as proxies for establishment locational choices. This simplifies the estimation 
but at the expense of aggregation bias. For example, as regulations based on a county’s 
attainment status are more stringent toward new plants, then plant births may be more 
sensitive to environmental regulations than existing plants in the same industry. As 
such, use of aggregate data on the stock of plants will not pick up regulatory effects on 
the flow of plant births. Some more recent research (List and McHone 2000) avoids 
this problem by examining plant births at the county level; however, while avoiding the 
potential for aggregation bias, this often comes at the expense of examining smaller 
geographic areas, such as individual states.1 In turn, Jeppesen et al. (2002) argue that 
the smaller the geographic area of the study, the larger the estimated influence of 
environmental regulation on new plant location decisions. 
A second general shortcoming of earlier research concerns aggregating births across 
year intervals. Primarily due to data limitations, some research (Levinson 1996; Becker 
and Henderson 2000; List 2001) use estimates for the number of plant births across 
5-year intervals. For example, Levinson (1996) uses Census data to estimate the number 
of new plant births between 1982 and 1987 assuming that manufacturing establishments 
in the 1987 Census that were not in the 1982 Census are by definition, new 
plants. While measuring plant births as the dependent variable, the temporal aggregation 
has potential problems in missing new plants that open and shut down within the 
5-year window. 
Finally, many earlier studies use cross-sectional models that fail to control for the 
simultaneous nature of firm location and pollution problems. List and McHone (2000) 
argue that this will lead to biased coefficient estimates as higher pollution levels, 
firm location, and more stringent regulatory controls are positively correlated cross-sectionally. 
They also suggest that analyzing the difference between new firm births 
in a region over a specified time period as a function of the difference in the region’s 
environmental regulation over the same time period is much more informative than 
considering the inter-regional variation of the same variables at one point in time. 
We follow the model used by Becker and Henderson (2000) by developing a panel 
data set to examine whether environmental regulatory stringency impacts the location 
decision of new pollution-intensive plant births. Our measure of environmental regulation 
is the attainment status of the federal standard for ozone pollution.2 We also 
disaggregate the data into low-, medium-, and high-polluting manufacturing industries 
allowing us to test whether the impact of environmental regulation varies across 
the pollution intensity of plants. List and McHone (2000) argue that while effects of 
environmental regulation may be minimal at the aggregate level, some industries, such 
as heavy polluters, may be more significantly affected by environmental regulation 
standards than others. 
The paper addresses a number of the shortcomings in the existing literature on 
locational behavior and the incidence of polluting manufacturing firms by using a 
newly available data set of establishment births and deaths, across all counties in the 
contiguous United States, representing a greater level of data than is typically used in 
other firm location studies. Specifically, by considering all new plant births in pollution- 
intensive manufacturing industries across all counties in the contiguous US, we 
avoid data constraints and estimation bias in previous studies. 
Estimation results from a Poisson panel data model reveal that the location decisions 
for pollution-intensive manufacturing plants are negatively impacted by our regulatory 
stringency measure. This result supports the recent work by Henderson (1996), Becker 
and Henderson (2000), List and McHone (2000), and List et al. (2004) and provides 
important empirical evidence toward the future development of pollution control strategies. 
Also, disaggregation by pollution intensity indicates that the location decisions of 
The most pollution-intensive new manufacturing plants are more significantly impacted 
than more moderate polluters. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a 
brief overview on the history of air quality regulations in the US. Then, the data are discussed 
before presenting the empirical model. Finally, results and concluding remarks 
are presented and discussed. 
 
 
2 AIR QUALITY REGULATION 
 
Prior to the 1970s, responsibility for regulating air polluting establishments fell primarily 
under the auspices of state governments. Since this time, the federal government has 
taken more responsibility for environmental regulation control beginning with Congress 
passing theNational Environmental PolicyAct and amendments to the Clean Air 
Act, as well as creating administrative bodies such as the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and the Council on Environmental Quality to enforce new regulatory 
statutes. The EPA established national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) that 
set standards on different polluting criteria to all regions throughout the US. However, 
this created problems for individual states as they were required to submit a state 
implementation plan (SIP) to detail how they would bring nonattainment areas into 
attainment. Not all states had the necessary resources to comply with stricter environmental 
regulations and that created uncertainty regarding how attainment could 
be achieved. Coupled with other problems, the federal government passed the 1977 
Clean Air Amendments Act (CAAA). 
 
Under the 1977 amendment, each July, every county in the US is classified as either 
in-attainment or out-of-attainment with regard to the national standards for each of 
the five criteria air pollutants. If a county is out-of-attainment, the state is required to 
submit a SIP indicating its plans to bring out-of-attainment areas into attainment of 
NAAQS. 
 
New plants locating in out-of-attainment areas face much stricter regulatory measures 
relative to those locating in attainment areas. For example, new polluting plants 
located in out-of-attainment areas are subject under federal guidelines to the lowest 
achievable emission rate (LAER) without consideration of cost. As such, plants must 
install the cleanest available technology. These abatement expenditures can represent 
significant installation costs for pollution-intensive plants. New polluting plants may 
also be required to purchase pollution offsets from existing plants. In contrast, only 
new plants locating in in-attainment areas that are Class A3 polluters are subject to 
these regulations. Even then, new plants are only required to install the best available 
control technology (BACT), which represents a weaker standard than LAER, and so, 
new polluting plants face much less costly regulation. Also, new plants that do not 
represent Class A polluters are not subject to regulation. In terms of equipment for 
existing plants within nonattainment areas, equipment is subject to reasonably available 
control technology whereas equipment for existing firms in in-attainment areas 
is not subject to regulatory control. 
 
 
3 DATA 
 
The primary data are drawn from a custom data set of establishment births and deaths 
from the Department of Statistics of US. Business, a branch of the Census Bureau.4 
Observations in the data set are the number of county level establishment births by 
three-digit SIC industries. The data set is a complete census of establishment births 
and deaths in the US. Unlike other sources, such as County Business Patterns, employment 
data, or Dun and Bradstreet’s business starts data, there is no suppression of data 
for disclosure reasons. The Census Bureau matches establishments across years and 
verifies each recorded birth and death to ensure that the establishment has not merely 
been renamed, merged with another establishment, or been otherwise reclassified (all 
of which are sources of mismeasurement in other data sets). A description of variables 
used in estimation is provided in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
All data on firm births are for the inter-year periods 1996–1997 and 1997–1998. 
In order to test the locational behavior response of manufacturers of varying polluting 
levels, we identify polluting manufacturers using the Gamper-Rabindran (2006) 
classification scheme. A breakdown of pollution-intensive industries by intensity is 
provided in Table 2. 
 
Data on county-level ozone attainment status was collected from the US. Environmental 
Protection Agency Green Book. Attainment status information is provided for 
each US county from 1992 to present, detailing reclassification from in-attainment 
to out-of-attainment for the primary federal standard for ozone by year. Finally, the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis provides personal income per capita and population 
data by county, and the Census Bureau provides property tax data by county. 
 
 
4 EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
To derive the reduced-form empirical model, we follow Becker and Henderson (2000) 
and adapt the stock model in Henderson et al. (1995) to a flow concept. This allows us 
to capture the effect of increased pollution regulatory measures in a partial equilibrium 
framework. In each separate industry, we assume that in any given time period, there 
is a supply of entrepreneurs in each county that might enter the industry given by 
 
 
 
 
 (1) 
 
 
 
where Yit is the flow of  newplants (gross births), Xit are spatial attributes that affect the 
local profit function, , and eit is a random error component. The supply relationship 
to a county between births and profit per plant space is upward sloping, indicating that 
the higher the per firm profit, more firms will be enticed into the industry. The curve 
may shift as county size changes, therefore, the Xit are shift parameters influencing 
the location of the curve. 
 
To represent profit opportunities for new firms, there is also a corresponding demand 
curve that depicts changes in per firm profit as a result of an increase in births. The 
demand curve can be locally upward sloping as births can positively affect per firm 
profits through localization or urbanization economies, or downward sloping as a 
negative impact on local output price can reduce per firm profit. 
 
Total births are given by the intersection of the demand and supply curves, in birth per 
firm profit space. This gives us a reduced-form equation 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
where Yi t represents births in county i in time t; Xit is a vector of county attributes 
presumed to influence the spatial location function; and eit is a contemporaneous 
independently and identically distributed error term. 
 
As the number of births are strictly integer values that are generally close to 
zero, Yit is modeled as a Poisson distributed random variable. The Poisson distribution 
is appropriate due to the preponderance of zeros and the discrete nature of the 
dependent variable. Equation 1 is estimated using the conditional Poisson model in 
Hausman et al. (1984), with robust standard errors (Wooldridge 1991). The property 
of the Poisson distribution indicates that the mean of Yit is equivalent to the variance 
of Yit . In the basic Poisson model, the probability of observing Yit births in county i 
at time t is 
 
 
  (3) 
 
where λit is the Poisson parameter or the expected value of Xit . The Poisson parameter 
is given by 
 
 
  
(4) 
 
where ln ; β is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; and 
αi are unobservable county-specific factors that may affect the location decision. 
Taking the natural approach of accounting for heterogeneity in the standard linear 
panel data model by transforming the variables about their means does not remove 
heterogeneity in the Poisson framework. Instead, in estimation, the fixed effect is 
conditioned out by modeling the event in the likelihood function as the sequence of 
births in a county over time, conditional on total births for that county over the sample 
period. Hence, the likelihood function becomes 
 
 
   (5) 
 
The conditional Poisson model captures between-county variation by the county fixed 
effects, leaving only within-county variation to be explained. An alternative modeling 
procedure (Levinson 1996; Gray 1997; List et al. 1999) is the conditional logit framework. 
If one reasons that unobserved characteristics of counties (such as labor productivity) 
are important in a firm’s location decision, and such factors should be controlled, 
a within-county approach such as ours is appropriate. However, a cross-sectional logit 
model may be appropriate if one attempts to model the attractiveness of a county 
relative to others. The conditional Poisson model avoids some of the weaknesses of a 
cross-section logit model, such as omitted variable bias. 
 
 
5 RESULTS 
 
Estimation results from the conditional Poisson models are presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
The high R2 measure of goodness of fit suggests that the Poisson model is appropriate. 
In total, we ran four versions of the model. The full model is presented in Table 3 and 
uses establishment births for all polluting industries as the dependent variable. The 
other threemodels disaggregate the dependent variable by pollution intensity to examine 
the impact of the explanatory variables on new establishments of low-, medium-, 
and high-polluting industries. Disaggregated results are presented in Table 4. 
 
We also consider the potential for endogeneity of the attainment status variable. 
An endogeneity issue may exist as new firm births in a specific county could increase 
pollution levels for the county as a whole, potentially causing the county tomove from 
an in-attainment to out-of-attainment status. We follow List and McHone (2000) and 
empirically check for endogeneity by running a second set of models using lagged 
values of attainment status and comparing results. The coefficients do not change 
significantly from the presented models indicating that endogeneity of the attainment 
status variable is not an issue in the data. 
 
 
 
The primary finding from the full model concerns the negative and statistically significant 
coefficient on the attainment variable. This suggests that as a county moves 
from a status of in-attainment to out-of-attainment, expected new polluting plant births 
fall by 0.10. These results are consistent with other recent studies (Henderson 1996; 
Becker and Henderson 2000; List and McHone 2000; List et al. 2004) in revealing 
that federal standards under the 1977 CAAA may be causing a “temporal browning”5 
across counties asmore stringent air quality regulations impact capital flows. Also, the 
size of attainment coefficient is less than the attainment variable reported in Becker 
and Henderson (2000) and List et al. (2004) and less than that reported by List and 
McHone (2000)—although this is expected as List and McHone (2000) modeled a 
smaller geographic area (New York State), and so, the estimates therein are likely to 
be inflated. 
 
Other results from the full model reveal that all coefficients are statistically significant 
at the 5% level and have the expected signs. Polluting firm births are positively 
impacted by county-level population. This supports a common finding in recent studies. 
One explanation for the positive and significant coefficient on the population 
variable is that polluting firms take advantage of labor-market economies by sharing 
a common labor pool, and so, there are more births in more densely populated areas. 
As expected, the coefficient on the property tax variable is negative and significant 
at the 5% level—suggesting that higher property taxes deter new plant births.6 The 
location decisions of polluting plants are also positively affected by counties with 
higher income per capita levels. Findings for income impacts are split across recent 
research with both positive and negative statistically significant coefficients reported. 
Our result rejects environmental justice concerns that polluting manufacturers locate 
plants in disproportionately poor areas. 
 
 
Comparing results by pollution intensity also yields some interesting findings. 
Observing the attainment variable across models reveals that increased regulatory 
standards associated with moving into out-of-attainment status have a greater impact 
on deterring the births of more pollution-intensive manufacturers—a finding that contradicts 
earlier studies that employ cross-sectional analyses (Levinson 1996; Gray 
1997). For example, as a county moves from in-attainment to out-of-attainment status, 
expected new plant births for high pollution-intensive manufacturers fall by 0.13. 
Further, the effects of increased regulatory standards are statistically insignificant for 
low pollution-intensive plants. The result is intuitive as, under CAAA regulations, 
high pollution-intensive manufacturers can expect to incur greater regulatory costs to 
reduce pollution levels to the lowest achievable emission rate relative to more moderate 
pollution-intensive manufacturers. As such, one can expect high pollution-intensive 
manufacturers to pay more attention to a county’s attainment status. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
 
Under the 1977 CAAA, counties moving from in-attainment to out-of-attainment are 
subject under federal guidelines to the lowest achievable emission rates, requiring 
new plants to install the cleanest available technology. Empirical studies over the last 
20 years have examined whether increased stringency in environmental regulations 
impact the location decision of polluting manufacturing plants. The majority of studies 
suggest that increased environmental regulatory stringency has no affect on location 
behavior, or at best, the relationship is negligible. We use newly available panel data 
with broad coverage of the US that provide a more generalized result than previous 
micro research and analyze plant births of polluting manufacturers over time as a 
function of county-level attainment status of the federal standard for ozone pollution. 
The results provide evidence that movement to out-of-attainment status significantly 
deters new high-polluting plant births in the affected counties. This suggests that the 
expected abatement expenditures under the CAAA represent significant installation 
costs for new pollution-intensive plants, and as such, impact firm location behavior. 
This finding provides an important policy note for future pollution control strategies 
and their implications on the spatial distribution of pollution-intensive firms as our 
results suggest a temporal browning process under current regulations, with polluting 
manufacturers more likely to locate in counties that are in-attainment of the federal 
standard, attracted by the lower regulatory costs imposed. 
 
We also find that stricter environmental standards as counties move into out-of attainment 
status have a greater impact on deterring new births of more pollution intensive 
plants as manufacturers face relatively higher abatement expenditures to 
reduce pollution levels to lowest achievable emission rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1 For example, List andMcHone analyze plant births in New York State while List (2001) 
considers foreign firm births in California. 
 
2 As the focus of the study is on plant births in pollution intensive (dirty) industries, the air quality 
pollutant that has received the most attention since the 1977 Clean Air Amendments Act is 
ozone. 
3 Plants considered as class A polluters are those with the potential to emit more than 100 tons 
of a criterion pollutant on an annual basis. 
 
4 The data were compiled by the Bureau of the Census specifically for this research. Hence the 
custom nature of the data set. 
 
5 See List and McHone (2000). 
 
6 Due to missing observations on property tax in some counties, we also include a dummy 
variable to capture the missing property tax data. We do not report the dummy coefficient in the 
results as a second model run without the missing property tax dummy yields the same results 
on all reported variables. 
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